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1. Introduction
Foreign policy can be explained in different ways depending on the approach taken. Much debate 
surrounds the importance of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy.
On one hand, neo-realists address foreign policy from a top-down perspective. These scholars 
describe how states are constrained by the international system. Internal actors are irrelevant in the 
explanation of foreign policy decision making (Waltz, 1979). More specifically, public opinion is 
insignificant in the analysis of foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 440). 
In contrast with these neo-realist assumptions, the idea of liberal democracy is conceived to carry 
out the wishes of the people. Thus the neo-realist perspective conflicts with liberal democratic 
values  (Elgie, 2002). More in line with liberal democracy, some scholars support the contention that 
domestic factors contribute to the comprehension of foreign policy. Thus, public opinion contributes 
somewhat to the explanation of foreign policy (Putnam, 1998; Cantir & Karboo, 2012, 11; Thérien 
& Noel, 2000: 160). This perspective is more accurate when analysing democracies. More precisely, 
institutions - such as elections, initiatives, referenda - give citizens the opportunity to express their 
views. For instance, it is possible for voters to sanction their governments (Jacobs & Page, 2005: 
107). This demonstrates a link between political leaders and the public. In this context, the citizens 
have the right to be informed and demand justifications (Schmitter, 2004: 48). Consequently, 
governments are obliged to provide the public with sufficient information regarding policy-
implementation. In other words, they  must give account for their actions. Therefore, in a democracy 
we should be able to observe how public opinion influences foreign policy through the 
accountability of the government. 
The expression of public opinion varies depending on the issue. This variation could be linked to 
highly  salient issues. We argue that public opinion will be more involved in the case of highly 
salient issues. In such circumstances, it would be interesting to examine if a higher saliency  leads to 
a more accountable government.
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While some scholars link foreign policy  with domestic debate, few of them link accountability with 
saliency as a means to verify the importance of domestic factors. Therefore, we will add new 
elements to the existing literature by  focusing on this link. The question guiding our research will 
try to confirm that governments give more account when facing a salient  issue within public 
opinion. Our question is the following:
Does the high salience of a foreign policy issue have an influence on the extent of account-
giving by democratic governments to citizens?
The second chapter of the paper will be dedicated to an overview of the existing literature. This will 
explain how our question fits into the field and also give the general context in which our paper 
takes place. The third chapter will present the hypothesis itself and the core of our theoretical 
framework to clarify  the concepts and theories. The fourth chapter is dedicated to a 
contextualisation of our topic to understand the wider context of our research. In the fourth chapter 
we will present our cases and actors to give a concrete dimension to our paper. The sixth chapter 
will discuss our data selection and methodology. The seventh chapter will contain the quantitative 
and qualitative analyses of our data. The eight chapter will discuss the implication of our results for 
the existing literature based on the issues we raised in the second chapter. The ninth chapter will 
begin with a generalisation of our issue by applying it beyond the frame of our particular case, 
followed by a discussion of possible future avenues of research based on our results.
2. Two Contributions
Our topic of research relates to several areas (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 89). The two topics on which we 
will focus are foreign policy and public administration studies. In this chapter, we will refer to the 
existing literature. We will show how our paper contributes to the existing body  of literature in these 
fields. This demonstration will highlight the lack of research in these areas and show how our 
question addresses this.
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The first contribution relates to the link between direct democratic institutions and foreign policy. 
The second refers to the importance of the administration in the implementation of foreign policy. 
Both of these contributions will focus on how the executive gives account  once a decision is made 
regarding a topic of high salience. 
2.1. Foreign policy and domestic sphere
There is extensive literature on the link between domestic factors and foreign policy. Research 
mainly focuses on the impact  of public opinion on the substance of foreign policy, however scholars 
have failed to address how it affects the process of policy implementation.
One of the most influential theoretical contributions to the link between domestic factors and 
foreign policy  is contained in the work of Putnam. His theory describes how a different sized win 
set could modify  outcomes of negotiations (Putnam, 1988). We can relate our case to this theory. A 
difference in the salience of a particular issue might affect the size of the domestic win set. 
According to the democratic ideal, the government will give more account in the process of 
negotiation and policy  implementation. This illustrates the influence of domestic factors on the 
outcome of these processes. In essence, the “freedom” of the government to negotiate on a topic is 
restricted by the obligation to give account to citizens. Our question attempts to empirically  verify 
this theoretical hypothesis. 
Putnam discusses the link between foreign policy and domestic factors. However, he does not 
explain the precise characteristics of the domestic factors influencing foreign policy. It is necessary 
to examine the characteristics of domestic factors to explain which elements influence a change in 
the win set. The national process of ratification is one example of a factor that may influence policy 
outcomes (Kaarbo, 2008). Another factor that influences a change in the win set is the domestic 
actors involved in the decision-making process.
Lucien M. Engelberts                         4
There are differing views on who are the most important domestic actors. Some scholars focus on 
the importance of national government as a key  institutional actor linking the domestic and 
international spheres (Verbeek & Van der Vleuten, 2008: 361; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012: 12). 
However, governments are not the only actors in this process. O’Connor and Vucetic argue that 
public opinion should not be underestimated in foreign policy  analysis, particularly  when it has the 
opportunity to be expressed through a referendum (O’Connor & Vucetic, 2010: 534). 
According to their view, we should expect that public opinion is an important factor in a democratic 
state. Hence, we presume that governments should give more account when faced with a salient 
public opinion. This increase in accountability  will be used to indicate the influence of public 
opinion. Our paper is not dedicated to an assessment of accountability itself. We shall use it as a 
tool to verify the link between public opinion salience and the foreign ministry agencies. We can 
use account-giving to indicate that high saliency influences policy implementation. 
There are a number of ways in which public opinion may be expressed. One way is by electing the 
government (Dai, 2005). However, I shall focus on public opinion as expressed through a 
referendum. Invoking a referendum institutionalises the salience of a political subject. It  allows the 
citizens to enforce political pressure on the government (Hug, 2008: 257). The referendum is an 
important domestic factor, allowing public opinion to modify the domestic win set. This is a strong 
indication of the influence of public opinion, as it affects the actual laws, not just the representative 
government. The link between salience and referendum will be explored further in chapter 5. 
The above approaches focus primarily on how the citizens, as an important  domestic actor, have a 
certain level of influence on the government. Most of the scholars have focused on the substance of 
foreign policy and whether it reflects the expressed public opinion, to what extent it is affected, and 
how to guarantee it  is being followed. Our approach differs from this as we will focus on the 
account-giving itself. According to the existing literature, the relation between a governmental 
administration and the citizens is one of control. Scholars evaluate to what extent the citizens can 
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control the administration and how they  can do so. This approach relies on the idea that  democracy 
implies a level of control by  the citizens over the delegates as the actions of the delegates are 
supposed to reflect the will of the citizens (Maskin & Tirole, 2004: 1034).
Regarding these considerations, Moravcsik for instance develops the idea, based on liberalist 
assumptions, that  the population can present their demands in the international sphere through 
representatives (Moravcsik, 2010: 113). This approach implies that representatives will follow the 
preferences of the population. Our paper will try  to add value to this understanding by examining 
how the representatives respond to the will of the citizens. Some demands may be taken into 
account more than others. By focusing on the salience in public opinion, we can compare the 
responses of the administration regarding each topic.
The purpose of our research is not focused on the control itself and how it guarantees the 
transposition of demands according to the citizens’ will. Indeed, giving account does not mean that 
the executive agencies stick to the will of the citizens. It is possible that the government informs the 
citizens that they are not doing what the citizens wish. Our research will indicate if the government 
informs about what it  does, regardless of whether they deviate from their mandate or not. This 
dimension is largely ignored in the existing literature. As Gourevitch presented, scholars have 
discussed the importance of domestic factors in the understanding of foreign policy. However, none 
of these approaches examine information provided by the administration about the implications of 
foreign policy. This is an important element which could contribute to a finer understanding of the 
link between foreign policy and domestic factors (Gourevitch, 1978: 901). Indeed by assessing if 
the government provides information when faced with a salient issue we can verify if they are 
providing information with which they can be controlled. The citizens can then discuss the 
information provided and take action based on this. The contents of the policy itself may differ from 
the will of the citizens. Our paper will not try to understand why or how it differs.
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Our approach proposes a different vision of democracy, named “deliberative democracy”, with 
accountability as a core element. An examination of the circumstances under which the executive 
agencies give more account has an added value for scholars supporting this vision of democracy 
(Biermann & Gupta, 2011: 1858). In assessing if an executive agency gives more account we are 
not trying to verify if it follows the will of the citizens to which they are giving account. Giving 
more account does not mean that the executive agencies are doing what  the citizens require them to 
do. Thus our thesis looks at the conditions in which a government gives account and will primarily 
try to demonstrate that, when faced with a salient public opinion, the government will provide more 
information about policy implementation.
2.2. Importance of the administrative body
We expect that public opinion may have a strong impact on the shaping of foreign policy. This 
impact manifests itself through a mandate given to executive agencies. We need to explore whether 
these agencies give weight to such a mandate and stick to it. As the existing literature demonstrates, 
implementation is an important step between the citizens’ expression of their wishes and policy 
enactment. It is not enough to focus on how a decision is made; it is also important to examine 
exactly  the way in which it is implemented. The reason for this is that a governmental program, 
from proclamation to enactment, is put through a number of different institutions, one of which is 
public administration (Treib, 2008: 4-5). This requires a more in-depth analysis of the 
administration’s role in foreign-policy making (Nincic, 1999: 42).
In order to evaluate its role, we will refer to the studies of decision-making within the 
administrative body. A central contribution to this issue is offered by  Allison who describes the 
decision-making process with its inputs and outputs. He describes how and why the government 
and administration make a particular decision (Allison, 1999). However, by focusing on the process 
of decision-making itself, he neglects to explain the asymmetry of information between the citizens 
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and executive agencies. According to some scholars, this asymmetry is so profound that it  reveals 
difficulties in monitoring policy implementation (Miller, 2005: 208). By delegating a task to the 
administration, the citizens lose part of the guarantee that this task will be performed according to 
their wishes. Thus, the different forms of control of the administration is a central issue in 
understanding how a policy is implemented. Moreover, some scholars argue that administration 
independence can be a source of conflict (Pollack, 2003: 108).
However, these opinions can be questioned by  looking more closely at the characteristics of the 
different factors, such as highly salient issues. This task is even more relevant in the case of 
democratic states, in which it is expected that administrative bodies will follow the mandate given 
by the citizens. Despite this expectation, scholars linking domestic public opinion with foreign 
policy fail to address the front line workers and the importance of their role in the implementation 
(Thérien, & Noel, 2000: 151; O’Connor & Vucetic, 2010).
However, the front line workers have a significant role to play in the shaping of policy. They  benefit 
from a certain degree of discretion, which allows them to follow goals which diverge from their 
original mandate (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 93). Thus the administration should not be underestimated in 
the process of implementation (Drezner, 2000: 733). We must consider the importance of the 
administration in foreign policy implementation (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012: 16; Meyers & Vorsanger, 
2003: 245). 
In much of the administrative studies, the difference in the availability of information between the 
executive agencies and the citizens can provide the basis for a sanction by the citizens. This 
guarantees that the executive agency is doing its task according to the mandate given. My paper will 
take an approach which supplements this issue. Indeed the asymmetry of information seems to be 
an issue for the citizens’ control over the executive agencies. However, in some cases information is 
in fact given by the administration, thereby  diminishing the obstacle presented by the asymmetry  of 
information. My paper does not intend to look at how a representative who did not follow his 
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mandate can be removed from office, but instead will examine the precise conditions under which a 
representative will share information and thus reduce the impact of the asymmetry of information 
(Downs & Rocke, 1994).
One of the characteristics we will focus on, relating to the asymmetry of information, is the 
executive agency’s degree of autonomy in relation to their mandate from the citizens. A more 
autonomous agency may be more willing to deviate from the implementation mandated by the 
citizens (Bach, Niklasson & Painter, 2012: 185). One of the reasons given by scholars for this 
deviation is that, due to the needs of the modern state, the administrative structure uses standard 
operating procedures (Kissinger, 1969: 263). Therefore, the administrative body is usually judged 
rather as an inertial structure. It  appears that the administration is even more prone to inertial 
behaviour in the foreign policy field because the influence of public opinion is supposedly less 
important (Drezner, 2000: 735). 
However, some scholars link the importance of public debate and implementation (Brighi & Hill, 
2008: 125). To approach this relation, we will refer to the principal-agent theory. I will use this 
theory  as a basis for the theoretical framework, therefore a more in-depth analysis will be presented 
in chapter 3. According to the principal-agent theory, and due to the asymmetry  of information, a 
more salient public opinion will require more information. In this case, executive agencies should 
be expected to give more account. Indeed, some scholars explain that  it is in the agencies’ own 
interests to follow the will of the citizens, to be rewarded if the job is well done or to be 
reprimanded if the implementation is not according to citizens’ wishes (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999: 
255).
Account-giving will be used as an indicator to establish if executive agencies attach importance to 
salient topics during the implementation process. The concept of democratic accountability is 
derived from the principal-agent theory. We are not going to address this concept in itself, rather we 
will use it to reveal if foreign ministry agencies are responsive to citizens’ concerns. If there are 
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different levels of account-giving, proved to be linked to a difference in issue saliency, we shall be 
able to connect account-giving and saliency. This will confirm that the citizens’ concerns are 
important and that it can be used to overcome the problems arising from asymmetrical information. 
In this model, account-giving is used as an indicator to examine whether the mandate given by  the 
citizens is more important than any of the other elements characteristic to administrative 
independence. The concept of account-giving will not be discussed in-depth; it is merely  assumed 
(Breuer, 2007: 555).
This short exploration of the literature demonstrates that a lot remains to be explored in the relation 
between foreign policy and domestic factors and also administrative studies. Therefore we will 
propose an hypothesis to answer our question, thereby introducing new developments to both fields.
3. Hypothesis and Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, we shall present the hypothesis and the main concepts guiding our research. The first 
section will be dedicated to a discussion of our hypothesis. The second section will explain how, 
based on this hypothesis, we will use the theoretical link of the principal-agent theory to relate the 
level of account-giving with the salience in public opinion. The third section is dedicated to a 
theorisation of account-giving. The final section will present two sub-hypotheses to reinforce the 
findings made by our research concerning the main hypothesis. These sub-hypotheses will confront 
our findings so as to confirm that our main hypothesis corresponds with the theoretical link between 
account-giving and saliency. Our hypothesis addresses a complex web of actors as part of a 
complex process thus the two sub-hypotheses will further clarify  and reinforce the various elements 
contained in the findings of our research.
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Our hypothesis is the following: 
A high degree of salience in the public debate will have a strong impact on the account-giving 
of states’ agencies and accordingly on foreign policy.
Foreign policy is a result of interactions between a large range of actors. It is therefore extremely 
complicated to model and analyse (Drezner, 2000: 735). To simplify the analysis, we will consider 
the administration and the government as one agent. Similarly, we will consider the citizens as a 
unitary body. Thus, the relation is confined to two actors. This will facilitate the testing of our 
hypothesis (Robinson, 2008: 146). 
3.1. Principal-Agent theory
We will use the economic inspired principal-agent theory to test our hypothesis. This theory 
describes how the principal (the citizens) delegates power to an agent (the executive agencies) with 
the expectation that the agent will then follow the will of the principal. From a political science 
perspective, this theory is expressed through the concept of democratic accountability, which links 
the citizens and the mandate they give to the representatives through elections (Breuer, 2007: 556). 
This is a useful tool to analyse the link between the intensity of public debate and account-giving 
(Elgie, 2001:3). More specifically, this theory will enable us to verify that the foreign policy 
agencies will give more account when faced with a highly salient issue. 
According to our hypothesis, the principal expects the agent to follow the delegation they give more 
rigorously with high saliency  issues. Nevertheless, asymmetrical information exists between the 
principal and the agent. As the executive agencies work with policies on a daily basis, they  have a 
more thorough knowledge of the policy. On the other hand, the principal has limited access to 
information regarding such policies. This asymmetrical relation is reinforced by the fact that the 
executive agencies have a certain degree of independence. Uncertainty  therefore exists as to the 
extent to which they will stick to their mandate (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 93). Considering the 
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asymmetry of information, the agent must give account because the principal should be informed 
regarding policy implementation. In essence, the provision of information reassures the citizens that 
executive agencies are following their mandate (Miller, 2005: 204).
The asymmetry in information creates a moral hazard. This moral hazard is a source of concern for 
the agent. Indeed, it is in their interest to provide information to the principal in order, for example, 
to stay in office, have more funding, etc. Based on these assumptions and our hypothesis, we expect 
that an agent will give more account in a situation in which the principal is more concerned. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the more the principal is concerned, the more account the agent will give 
(Elgie, 2001: 5).
Moreover, in a democratic state a stronger presumption exists that the agent will follow the mandate 
given by the citizens (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 95). Therefore, we should expect a form of account-
giving in a democracy. The principal-agent theory describes two solutions to the above-mentioned 
moral hazard. The two solutions are namely, ex ante and ex post controls. As we are focusing on 
account-giving, the ex post control is the relevant form of control for this paper (Elgie, 2001: 5). 
3.2. Account-giving
Derived from the principal-agent theory, we demonstrated the need for account-giving. We will now 
describe in more depth what is to be understood by account-giving and, in a broader sense, 
accountability. According to Bovens: “Accountability can be defined as a social relationship in 
which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant 
other” (Bovens, 2005: 184-185). He adds that the accountor (agent) could be an agency which is 
accountable for an accountee (in our case, the electorate or, in other words, the principal). 
According to this definition, he states that this creates a relationship  between the actors, which can 
be expressed in different ways. First, the accountor must inform the accountee. Second, the 
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accountee must be able to question the accountor based on this information. Third, the accountee 
can evaluate the behaviour of the accountor (Bovens, 2005: 184-185).
Our thesis will mainly  focus on the first element of the relation. This element would be sufficient in 
itself to verify the existence of accountability. However, by  adding more elements, we will reinforce 
the validity  of our findings on how the foreign ministry agencies are affected by the public opinion. 
We will therefore present two sub-hypotheses later in this chapter to complete our understanding of 
the link between principal and agent. 
In order to clarify the definition of Bovens, we will use the concept of “felt accountability”. It “(...) 
suggests that we examine how bureaucrats as holdees process the information/signals they receive 
and how they then make decisions accordingly.” (Yang, 2012: 271-272). “Felt accountability” is 
presumably stronger when the public opinion is more salient. Thus, account-giving will change 
according to the relation drawn by Bovens. The concept of “felt accountability” introduces the idea 
of proportionality. If the agent  feels more pressure it will give more account, proportional to the 
level of public opinion salience. Bovens introduces the relation and Yang completes it by saying 
that there is a proportionality between the principal and agent.
3.3. Sub-hypotheses
Now that  we have demonstrated the theoretical and proportional link between the principal and the 
agent, we propose two sub-hypotheses which will clarify our main hypothesis. The two sub-
hypotheses will refer to elements that will be presented in more depth in the following chapters, 
such as our cases and actors. It is necessary to include these elements here in order to give a clear 
picture of our sub-hypotheses.
First, we must examine the reasons for which account is given. Our main hypothesis supposes that 
more account is given in the case of high public opinion saliency. However, there might also be 
external causes for account-giving, independent of the principal-agent relation. For present 
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purposes, we must link the account-giving with felt accountability. Nevertheless, account-giving 
may not be due to felt accountability but to other sources instead. For instance, we could also 
presume that more account is given because an agreement has an impact on legislation. Thus our 
first sub-hypothesis is the following:
Important changes to the current legislative framework brought about by the adoption of a 
new  agreement will have a strong impact on the account-giving of states’ agencies.
Depending on the confirmation of this hypothesis we can conclude that account-giving is indeed 
due to public opinion. To draw a solid conclusion we must be certain that  public opinion is the key 
factor in the explanation of account-giving. Without this element we cannot be sure of the fact that 
foreign policy is affected by domestic factors (Lavenex, 2006). 
Another dimension should also be addressed to confirm that the agent’s felt  accountability responds 
to our principal, the citizens. It  might be possible that account-giving is not directed to the principal 
we choose. Therefore we propose our second hypothesis to identify the recipient of accountability:
The accountability given by the front line workers is primarily aimed at the principal, in our 
case, the citizens.
We must demonstrate that the information provided by our agent is directed to our principal. If this 
element is missing we cannot draw implications about the importance of the principal as a recipient 
of the information.
These two sub-hypotheses will be addressed in detail in chapter 8 and should provide us with the 
necessary  information to clarify the link between public opinion saliency and the account-giving of 
states’ agencies. 
In conclusion, based on this theoretical framework and hypothesis, we can proceed with a selection 
of cases and actors and establish our methodology. This will set  the basis on which we can generate 
empirical results.
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4. Contextualisation
In this chapter we will contextualise our case. This will make my thesis and its background more 
concrete. The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will present the Swiss political 
environment and describe how its direct democratic institutions have an added value with which to 
test our hypothesis. The second section will describe the Swiss legislative process, which will 
provide the framework in which the referendums take place. In section three, we will present the 
relation between Switzerland and the European Union (EU)1, which shapes the general political 
context for our cases.
4.1. Switzerland as a Laboratory
We consider Switzerland as a “laboratory” in which we can analyse how public opinion saliency 
affects the state agency accountability (Sciarini & Marquis, 2000: 150). The existence of direct 
democratic institutions has had a great impact on the shaping of the Swiss political system (Trechsel 
& Kreisi, 1996: 185; Christin & Trechsel, 2002: 416; Lutz, 2006: 46). Indeed, Switzerland is the 
most experienced country regarding direct  democracy  at a national level (Sciarini & Marquis, 2000: 
150). The presence of direct  democratic institutions gives rise to a substantial amount of 
information, which we can utilise to test our hypothesis.
Indeed, the characteristics specific to a direct democracy make it easier to identify our variable. This 
is because a direct democracy allows us to study directly the behaviour of voters and elite rather 
than rely  on policy preferences measured in opinion polls. The impact on policy  results from the 
direct participation of citizens in policy proposals and controls. Swiss citizens are not  merely 
electing representatives to fulfil a political mandate but  are also acting directly as the ultimate veto 
player in the legislative process (Lutz, 2006: 53). This will help  us to link the salience of a 
particular topic with a choice expressed through a vote and subsequently the actions of the 
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1 When an institution or organisation appears for the first time, we propose an abbreviation which we will use for any 
subsequent reference to the institution or organisation throughout our thesis.
administration related to the particular issue. This institutional frame, which involves the public to a 
high degree in the process of ratification, makes it simpler to identify which topics are subject to 
intense debate.
In this process Swiss citizens are considered to be acting as a sovereign by accepting or rejecting an 
international agreement. Therefore, the relation between the public opinion and state’s agencies 
should theoretically be stronger than in states without such direct democratic institutions (Kriesi, 
Bernhard & Hänggli, 2007: 9). This might have an impact on the level of accountability. The Swiss 
case will make it simpler to operationalise the link between saliency issues and account-giving.
The interaction between the referendum and other institutions in the wider legislative process will 
be presented in the next section. We will explain the interaction between different actors and 
underline the importance of the citizens as part of the legislative process. The significance of the 
referendum as an indicator of salience will then be discussed in chapter 5.
4.2. Legislative process
The Swiss legislative process is complex and involves a large number of different actors and 
institutions. To make it clearer, an illustration is provided below. The process is divided into three 
different phases: The pre-parliamentary, parliamentary and post-parliamentary phase. It  is important 
to briefly  explain this process in order to understand how the principal actors (the citizens as the 
principal and states agencies as the agent) and referendums are linked. Indeed, the relationship 
between these different actors and institutions have an impact on the behaviour of such actors i.e. a 
change in account-giving.
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In the pre-parliamentary  phase, the first step  of the legislative process is induced by  the Conseil 
Fédéral (Federal Council), which drafts an avant-projet (pre-law project).2  This act could be the 
result of a popular initiative or a parliamentary motion. In our cases the pre-law project is the result 
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2 All the technical and legal terms are given for the first time in their original French title, followed by an English 
translation; any subsequent appearance will be in English. This also applies to publication titles which were originally in 
French.
Illustration 1: “Birth of a Law”
of negotiations between the Swiss authorities and the EU. The pre-law project is then published to 
initiate public consultation. This consultation is open to all political actors such as the political 
parties, civil society such as unions, and other political institutions such as cantons. It  is also open to 
citizens to express their opinions on the proposed texts. Based on the results of this consultation the 
Federal Council drafts a final project and submits it with a message to the parliament for approval 
and adoption. If much criticism or concerns are raised in the consultation process, the likelihood of 
a referendum will be increased in the post-parliamentary phase.
Next is the parliamentary phase. The parliament is composed of two chambers: the Conseil 
National (National Council) and the Conseil des Etats (States’ Council). Both chambers must 
approve of the project  before it can enter into the post-parliamentary phase. The project will be 
examined by  the competent Commission in each Council. These Commissions will either propose 
to accept or reject the proposal or accept with some reservations and/or modifications. Based on 
these proposals, each Council will then vote on the project. If both Councils do not vote to accept 
the project, the procédure de la navette (shuttle procedure) will be activated. The purpose of this 
procedure is to reach a compromise between the two Councils. If after three shuttles both Councils 
are not agreed on the law, a procédure de concilliation (conciliation procedure) is initiated. The goal 
of this procedure is to reach a consensus. If no such consensus is achieved, the project is abandoned. 
However, if a consensus is reached, the project is subjected to a vote. If the vote is a success, the 
law is adopted and published in the Feuille Fédérale (Federal Sheet). Depending on the nature of 
the text, it will be submitted to different direct democratic tools. Again, throughout the 
parliamentary  debates, the parties can use the threat of initiating a referendum; the referendum acts 
as a “Sword of Damocles”. Thus, the referendum ensures that the voices of all parties are taken into 
consideration in the debate.
The post-parliamentary  phase begins with the application of the relevant direct democratic 
institutions, depending on the nature of the law in question. One such institution is the referendum 
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obligatoire (mandatory referendum).3  This will be initiated if the law entails a modification of the 
Constitution, or the joining of a collective security organisation (such as NATO) or supranational 
community  (such as the EU). Another institution is the referendum facultatif (optional referendum). 
This concerns all laws not covered by the mandatory referendum. If any citizens or groups are 
opposed to this particular text, they  can collect 50,000 signatures of Swiss citizens within 100 days. 
If this process is successful the text will be subject to a votation populaire (popular vote). If the 
majority of the citizens support the text, the law will finally enter into force.
In our particular case, the process can be summarised as follows: the Federal Council negotiated the 
Bilateral Agreements and subsequently  proposed them to the parliament which accepted them. In 
the case of Schengen/Dublin (S/D), which we chose for our paper, an optional referendum was 
initiated and finally  adopted by  the citizens in the final instance. As this description demonstrates, 
the optional referendum is the relevant institution for our thesis. Thus, in chapter 5, we will focus 
more specifically on its importance as an indicator of salience.
4.3. Swiss EU relations
A referendum is always held in a particular context. Thus it  is important to briefly discuss the 
Swiss-EU relationship to understand the significance of our cases. Due to its direct democratic 
nature, Switzerland offers a unique example of relations with the EU. The prominence of EU 
questions in the public debate is one feature of this particularism. The link between direct 
democracy  practices and the EU gives citizens the opportunity  to make decisions on EU-related 
policies (Church, 2004: 272). Despite not being a member state, the Swiss citizens are regularly 
questioned regarding European-related issues. 
A complete examination of the history of the Swiss-EU relation would require further analysis 
however, for present purposes, we are going to focus specifically on the period which began with 
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http://www.admin.ch/cp/f/40d95f4e_1@fwsrvg.html Consulted the 08.05.2013 & Suisseurope, Ed. II, July 2004, pp. 13.
the popular refusal of the membership  of the European Economic Area on 6th December 1992. This 
refusal forced the Swiss authorities to find a solution to the dilemma posed between being a 
member or remaining outside of the EU. Membership of the EU is not an option due to the citizens’ 
opposition to it, while a policy of isolation is not feasible due to Switzerland’s geographical 
situation. Instead, the solution the Swiss found was to advocate for a so called “third track”.4  This 
track is a compromise between the popular will of not being a member of the EU and the 
geopolitical reality imposed on Switzerland to collaborate closely with the EU. This reality creates a 
unique relation with the EU. Switzerland is strongly and deeply  integrated within the network of 
European member states. In fact, its integration is arguably more in-depth than other EU member 
states in some cases(Vahl & Grolimund, 2006: 5). Since 2000, the Swiss citizens voted 7 times on 
EU related topics. In these 7 votes the Swiss citizens confirmed their choice of the “third track” in 
its relations with the EU.
The follow up of this “third track” by the authorities led to the signature of the first set of Bilateral 
Agreements in 1999. All agreements relate to economic policy. There are seven agreements5, which 
are linked by a “guillotine clause”. This means that they are linked by their acceptance; it was not 
possible to refuse one without abandoning the others. This risk is still present as, every time the EU 
enlarges, the Swiss citizens can object to the expansion of the agreement to include the new 
members and thus render all agreements invalid. This point explains why we did not take this set of 
agreements as a source for our cases.
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4 Message relatif à l’approbation des accords bilatéraux entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne, y compris les actes 
législatifs à la transposition des accords («accords bilatéraux II»), pp. 5594.
5 1) Free movement of persons, 2) Technical Barriers to Trade, 3) Public Procurement Markets, 4) Agriculture, 5) 
Research, 6) Civil Aviation, 7) Overland Transport http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00500/index.html?lang=en 
Consulted the 08.05.2013.
As the first set of agreements negotiated did not cover all fields, a second set of nine agreements6 
were negotiated. It was composed of the “leftovers” of Bilateral Agreements I. Along with these 
leftovers, Switzerland requested to add the S/D agreement and in return the EU asked to add the 
Fight against Fraud Agreement. These agreements were not legally linked therefore during the 
ratification process Switzerland could have decided to renounce one of them without consequences 
for the others (Schwok, 2006).7 The cases we are going to use in our research belong to this second 
set of agreements, referred to as Bilateral Agreements II.
The “third track” indicates the recurrence of votes and the existence of constant debate in the public 
opinion. This should, according to our hypothesis, force the administration to inform and give 
account on its involvement with the EU. This justifies why we are choosing cases belonging to this 
particular context. First of all it is clearly linked with foreign policy. Most importantly, it  is due to 
the fact that European related issues are generally important in Swiss political life. The salience of 
EU issues is on average higher than other policy areas. Within this EU policy context, each topic 
has its own characteristics. This leads to different levels of salience within the existing high average 
of saliency. Thus as our hypothesis compares a difference in salience, this fact makes it  easier for us 
to access information without compromising the testing of our hypothesis. The positive element for 
research purposes here is that the data is more readily available.
As we have demonstrated, Switzerland presents a unique case due to its direct democratic 
institutions, legislative process and relations with the EU. These particular characteristics will assist 
our research as it increases data availability and collection.
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législatifs à la transposition des accords («accords bilatéraux II»), pp. 5614
5. Cases and actors
In this chapter, we will present the selection of our cases and actors on which we will base our 
methodology. The first section is divided into three parts. The first part relates to our two chosen 
cases. The second part  supports our choice of the referendum as a relevant indicator of salience. The 
third part presents the potential limits to the value of the referendum as such an indicator. In the 
second section of this chapter, we will present our actors and support their values in the assessment 
of account-giving.
5.1. Cases
Our hypothesis requires a choice of cases that enables us to isolate only one variable: the salience in 
public opinion. Our cases belong to the Bilateral Agreements II between Switzerland and the EU, 
and belong to the “third track”.
The two agreements on which our thesis will focus are the Schengen / Dublin (S/D) agreement and 
the Environment (ENV) agreement. A primary element of these cases is their process of 
ratification, which allows a completely  open public debate.8  Also, the general frame of the 
processes share the same context, thus the salience variable could be easily isolated in comparing 
these two cases. These agreements present a useful comparative case to illustrate the salience within 
public opinion as illustrated by the holding of a referendum. 7 out of these 8 agreements were 
submitted to an optional referendum and only one succeeded: S/D (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006).
Our question raises the issue of salience and its impact on the foreign ministry  agencies. We use the 
existence of referendums to operationalise salience (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006: 21). As 
aforementioned, Swiss direct democratic institutions play an important role in decision making. 
Indeed the referendum could be used as a “veto” by the citizens (Treschsel and Sciarini, 1998: 102) 
notably in the post-parliamentary  phase. Citizens are directly  included in the final steps of the 
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ratification procedure, which has direct and important implications for policies (Trechsel, 2010: 
1054). This allows them to have a control over the elites (Christin & Trechsel, 2002: 418). This 
influence is also present in the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phases. In the pre-
parliamentary  phase, the consultation process allows opponents to raise their concerns and this 
could indicate the potential existence of a referendum at a later stage. In the parliamentary  phase, 
the parties who disagree with parliament decision making can threaten the proposal of a referendum 
to push their own idea in the agenda.
We consider the holding of referendum to be a strong indicator of difference in salience, thus on this 
basis we can compare S/D which was petitioned and ENV which was not. (Sciarini, Nicolet & 
Fischer, 1998: 23). In addition, according to polls, voters consider S/D as an important issue for 
themselves and for the country.9  Hence salience is demonstrated by the existence of a referendum. 
The fact that these polls show that the citizens consider this to be an important issue supports our 
proposition.
In our cases, the law is subject to an optional referendum.10  The constitutional reserve for this 
democratic institution demonstrates the link between salience and referendum.11  Indeed, a high 
level of salience must  exist prior to the initiation of a referendum as, without a high level, it would 
be difficult to collect 50,000 signatures in 100 days. A successful referendum needs a certain 
amount of support from various actors (Sciarini & Marquis, 2000: 150). This fact demonstrates that 
saliency precedes and is independent of a referendum (Eschet-Schwarz, 1989: 6; Kriesi, Bernhard 
& Hänggli, 2007: 9). Thus, the referendum in these circumstances is an indicator of high issue 
saliency. Furthermore, in the case of a successful petition for an optional referendum, the ensuing 
campaign in anticipation of the referendum reinforces the pre-existing saliency. The S/D agreement 
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Consulted on the 27.03.2013
10 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2005/00.html Consulted on the 27.03.2013
11 Federal Constitution, Art. 141.
exemplifies a successful petitioning campaign based on the pre-existence of a high salience. On the 
contrary, the ENV agreement did not generate sufficient concern among citizens to lead to a 
referendum. (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006:13). Thus, referendums allow a portion of the population to 
subject a salient topic to a popular vote. This process further reinforces salience while the debate is 
taking place, nevertheless a certain level of salience is necessary at the beginning (Sciarini & 
Marquis, 2000: 150).
An additional feature of the optional referendum, reinforcing its value as an indicator of salience, is 
the fact that the debate is oriented solely  around the raised subject. In our case, the debate is mostly 
oriented around the relation between Switzerland and its foreign policy and Europe. Thus the debate 
is unaffected by unassociated questions, staying focused on the topic and its implication raised 
during the vote. As a result, the public debate reflects the citizens’ opinion and concern about this 
particular question and not, for example, a disagreement with the government’s general politics 
(Sciarini & Marquis, 2000: 153).
5.2. Actors
The Swiss government is composed of different departments. The relevant department for our paper 
is the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). It is composed of different agencies but the 
central one for this paper is the Directorate for European Affaires (DEA). 
More precisely, for policy implementation, the system operates at  three levels. The first is the 
chancellery, which informs the citizens about the corpus juris. The second level consists of the 
DEA. The third are those departments concerned specifically with the implemented policies. We are 
focusing much of our paper on the DEA because it governs communications about Swiss-EU policy 
and is the umbrella department for EU questions (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006: 59).12 Indeed, the DEA 
coordinates the different departments and is the main information provider for EU-related policies.13 
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Hence, it is the most relevant government agency to test  our hypothesis. This agency  produces 
documents and communicates about its work. As our hypothesis is that the account-giving changes 
due to variations in saliency, all sources provided by the DEA can be used to verify  if this is the 
case. Our main task consists in comparing the varying intensity in communications from the DEA 
for different topics to test if the salience modifies its account-giving. Thus by  focusing on the DEA 
we will be able to observe our dependent variable. According to the principal-agent theory, the 
DEA will act as the agent while the citizens are considered as the principal. In summation we expect 
that, if the citizens’ opinion has a high level of salience, the DEA will react to it  by giving more 
account. 
In conclusion, the assessment of referendums as an indicator of salience will take place in the 
context of our two cases, namely S/D and ENV agreements. The account-giving will be examined 
using information provided by our actor, the DEA.
6. Data and methodology
In this chapter, we will present  our data and the way in which we have selected it. The first section 
will explain how the data allows us to observe the dependent variable and the parameters. We will 
also present and defend the data we will use in the quantitative and qualitative analysis. The second 
section will be a presentation of our quantitative and qualitative methodology. The third section will 
discuss the possible shortcomings of our data and methodology selection.
6.1. Data
To achieve consistent results we must provide data that enables a systematic compilation. This will 
provide us with information to test our hypothesis and answer our question. In the collection of 
data, we will mainly focus on the documentation published by the administration. 
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Our main focus will be on the DEA as it  is our principal actor in communication regarding EU-
related issues. For example, the DEA publishes a bulletin d’information (news bulletin), six times a 
year (in average), called “Suisseurope”.14 The first bulletin was published in March 2004. We have 
chosen to examine all 37 bulletins published by Suisseurope since March 2004 up to and including 
May 2013. Our data includes all 177 articles contained in the 37 publications. This is done to collect 
as much data as possible and to ensure the most reliable inference is made. Even though the 
referendum on S/D was held on 5th June 2005, its effects are as evident before and during the 
campaign as they  are after the vote and during the implementation phase. The publications are 
bilingual so all the articles are written in German and French. As they have exactly the same content 
we will only  count these once. In our cases we will read and analyse the French version of each 
article.
Our reading should enable us to identify if an article has the S/D or ENV agreement as its topic. We 
must identify key terms to use as indicators for both agreements. The most obvious key term is an 
explicit  reference to S/D or ENV. However, an article can have as its topic the S/D or ENV 
agreements without explicitly referring to these terms. Thus we must determine other key  terms 
related to the agreements, which will enable us to identify which agreement is being discussed. To 
do this, we will refer to other sources provided by the administration such as the ABC of European 
Policy.15 If these sources clearly link a particular term with the S/D or ENV topic, we will use this 
particular term as an indicator while reading the Suisseurope articles. For instance, if an article 
discusses the FRONTEX16  agency it will be counted as the S/D agreement, or if an agreement 
mentions the European Environment Agency (EEA) we will count it as the ENV agreement.
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16 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union, from French Frontières extérieures.
In our count, no distinction will be made between the different form of articles. On one hand some 
articles are entitled Forum and give a voice to representatives of different organisations and people 
who are not members of the administration, while on the other hand there are purely factual articles, 
which merely present factual information. We consider that differences in article format have no 
impact on the quantitative analysis. However as we will discuss later, the difference in form might 
provide a source of information for a qualitative analysis. Thus we will primarily use Suisseurope as 
a basis for our research, however we must supplement this with other sources to complete the 
analysis.
6.2. Methodology
Our methodology should allow us to test the relation between the electorate and DEA. This will be 
carried out by reference to the principal-agent theory. We think the case study methodology is most 
suitable to perform this task. This methodology is particularly relevant in cases where you try to 
draw a causal mechanism (George & Bennett, 2005: 21). If we want to test that a more salient issue 
results in increased account-giving we need to draw a causal mechanism between these two 
elements. S/D and ENV agreement share the same procedure and context of negotiation. Thus the 
only variable is the different salience during the ratification process. This allows us to use the 
salience as the independent variable without external causes affecting the link between public 
opinion and account-giving in this case. The referendum will be an indicator of variations in 
salience. The information given by the executive agencies is the indicator of account-giving.
We will perform a number of steps to carry  out our research and test our hypothesis. The first step is 
a quantitative analysis of our sources. It will be completed by a more in-depth reading of the articles 
to confirm the findings of the quantitative analysis. The goal of the quantitative analysis is to verify 
whether the relevant states agencies are communicating more in the case of the S/D agreement or 
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ENV agreement. The qualitative analysis will look more closely at the purpose of the articles to see 
how the information could be considered as account-giving.
We will present a timeframe to clarify the purposes for which the information is published. We 
believe there has been an evolution in the way in which account is given in almost ten years of 
publication. The actuality  of the agreements evolve through time and this should be reflected in the 
account-giving. If the administration is supposed to give account to the principal we suppose that  it 
is reactive to the evolution of time and the different events that have occurred. Thus by integrating a 
time-framed evaluation, we provide the basis on which to develop our analysis.
To clarify  the actualities of the agreements, we will present the main milestones in their evolution. 
The first significant milestone in the process of negotiation and ratification is 26th October 2004. 
This was the date of signature for both agreements. Both texts were also approved by the parliament 
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Illustration 2: Time comparison of the process of ratification of the 
different agreements.
on 17th December 2004. Following this, the process differs and each agreement follows its own 
agenda.
The following dates are relevant milestones specific to the S/D agreement:
• The referendum is issued on 31st March 2005.
• The referendum is concluded on 4th April 2005. 
• The vote is held on 5th June 2005. 
• The agreement is ratified on 20th March 2006 
• It entered into force on 1st March 2008.
• It is operational on 12th December 2008 for ground borders and in March 2009 for airport borders.
The following dates are important milestones for the ENV agreement:
• The agreement is effective on 1st April 2006.
We will divide the timeframe into 4 periods based on the above milestones. The particular features 
of each period will contribute to our understanding of the evolution in account-giving. 
• The first period is from the 1st edition to the 4th; this period is named: The Campaign.
• The second is from the 5th edition to the 15th; this period is named: The Post-Campaign.
• The third runs from the 15th to the 22nd; this period is named: The Original Implementation 
• The fourth runs from the 18th to the 36th; this period is named: Development in the 
Implementation.
In our quantitative analysis, we will first enumerate our data to compare the amount of information 
given for each agreement. From this we will identify on which agreement there are more articles 
published. We will look at the publications to compare the flow of information between the two 
agreements. We will count the number of articles dedicated to the S/D agreement and ENV 
agreement. This will indicate the quantity of information provided for each agreement.
Once this first step is complete, we will engage in a qualitative reading of Suisseurope bulletins 
which will entail a closer look at the contents of the articles. This reading will be supplemented with 
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other publications provided by the administration to support the findings based on Suisseurope 
bulletins. Throughout the analysis, we will provide a representative sentence to clearly  illustrate our 
points. This more detailed examination will analyse how the DEA addresses the principal and 
allows us to establish if the information is part of account-giving. More specifically, we will 
examine if they address the importance of voters, citizens, referendums, etc. This will clarify not 
only the level of information but also its destination and purpose. 
Once both analyses are complete, we must confront the results with our two sub-hypotheses. During 
our research we will try  to find data with which to verify these hypotheses in order to reinforce our 
final conclusion about the main hypothesis. For the first hypothesis, we will rely  primarily on the 
text of Sandra Lavenex published in “Borders and security governance: managing borders in a 
globalised world”. She makes a detailed analysis of different effects of S/D on the Swiss political 
system. We will confront the findings derived from our main hypothesis with a theoretical 
discussion of this sub-hypothesis in order to verify whether account-giving is due to felt 
accountability or other causes. 
The purpose of our second sub-hypothesis is to clarify that the DEA is not giving a high level of 
account merely because the S/D has a large impact on the pre-existing legal framework. We will 
examine whether the DEA issues these articles in response to the public opinion, for example, if 
they  refer to specific requests for information. As the purpose of these sub-hypotheses is to confirm 
and reinforce our research findings, we will discuss them both in chapter 8.
6.3. Limits of Methodology
We can identify two types of mistake based on the methodology and choice of data sources. The 
first focuses on the agent side of the relation and argues that the source does not sufficiently  cover 
account-giving or does not present  the most suitable way in which to operationalise it. The second 
says that the principal side of the relation is also not properly operationalised, for instance the use of 
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the referendum as an indicator of salience. We will discuss these limits of our research and present 
how we think they can be overcome in further research.
For the first side of the relation, our findings are based on one major source of information: 
Suisseurope. We will supplement this source with other publications in the process of analysis to 
evaluate the inference based on Suisseurope. Nevertheless, it could be argued that these sources are 
rather limited as they are produced by the one office, the mission of which is to communicate. It 
could be considered as rather tautologic to say that a department communicates because its mission 
is to communicate. 
This critique is understandable, nevertheless we wonder how we can account for the different levels 
of communication between different topics. If our findings indicate that the DEA is giving more 
account in the case of S/D than ENV, this different  level in account-giving must be justified. A 
quick look at the information-giving by the relevant departments for the S/D: DEA, Federal 
Department of Justice and Police (DFJP), Federal Department of Finance (FDF) and for the ENV : 
Federal Office of the Environment (FOEN) should confirm the variation in account-giving. Each 
department concerned with the S/D agreement provides much information online, for instance a 
FAQ17 is proposed. In contrast, the FOEN, which is supposed to work on the ENV agreement, gives 
no more information than that already provided by the DEA. While we should not be surprised to 
see that account is given according to the legal pre-requisites and mission of the office, this does not 
explain the difference in intensity between the different agreements.
Regarding this difference in intensity, it would be interesting to propose other studies in other 
contexts or countries to confirm whether the difference in degree of account-giving between salient 
issues is the same or not. If, as we suppose, a democratic state gives more account when faced with 
a high salience issue, a difference between topics should be observed in any case. Information might 
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be lower or higher but a difference in flow should be expected nevertheless. This would reinforce 
our findings by proving that accountability is proportionate to salience.
On the second side of the relation, the pertinence and reliability of a referendum as a strong 
indicator of salience can be questioned. We consider referendums as a form of institutionalised poll 
leading to the adoption of a law. However, we did not address the motivation of actors initiating 
referendums. It could be a tool used by political parties to mobilise their electorate for instance 
(Lutz, 2006: 51). It could also be a tool for social entrepreneurs to gain visibility at a national level. 
The simplicity of a referendum as an indicator might risk hiding the complexity  of salience and the 
reasons for which it exists. However, this criticism does not directly  address the link between 
salience and account-giving. As our paper does not intend to understand why a topic is salient or 
simply  what salience is, this limitation does not impact greatly on our research. If salience is due to 
an electoral calculus, this does not change the fact that salience itself exists.
Based on the data selection and discussion of the methodology  and its limits, we have the necessary 
information with which to begin our analysis.
7. Data Analyses
This chapter will present the data analyses, from which we will obtain results to verify  our 
hypothesis and answer our question. The first section will be a quantitative comparison between the 
information given for S/D and ENV. The second section will be a qualitative analysis which, based 
on our timeframe, will evaluate if the information constitutes account-giving by the DEA.
7.1. Quantitative analysis
This analysis will try to establish if the DEA gives more account when facing a salient topic.
The reading of the news bulletins gives this result:
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• Articles related to S/D: 43
• Articles related to ENV: 7
A preliminary comment is needed before concluding on these initial findings. Four articles are 
common to both agreements and are a general presentation of the Bilateral Agreements II. Thus 
they  are not dedicated specifically to either agreement. This does not change the proposed 
difference between the two agreements, nevertheless we think it is important to highlight this point. 
This means that  only  3 articles out of a total of 177 mention the ENV and 43 S/D. Based on this, it 
is clear that S/D is represented to a much larger extent than ENV. 
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Table 1
Total of articles S/D ENV
Illustration 3: Timeframe of Suisseurope publications
A closer look at the articles according to our timeframe reinforces these initial findings. First, there 
is a greater number of articles dedicated to both agreements in the period surrounding the signature 
and subsequent approbation by the parliament. Then it is particularly  interesting to focus on the 
fourth issue of April 2005. It was published during the campaign and, as Illustration 3 demonstrates, 
this issue is completely dedicated to S/D. After the peak of communication at the beginning, the 
period following the agreement’s entry  into force is followed by a diminution in the information 
flow in 2009. It then increases again in 2010 with some peaks in 2011, which shows the increased 
account given in relation to the changes to and development of S/D.
These findings can be considered as the first step to confirm our hypothesis and help answer our 
question. Our hypothesis asserts that states’ agencies are supposed to give more account when faced 
with a high salience in the public debate. According to the number of articles dedicated to S/D in 
contrast with those dedicated to ENV, we have passed the first hurdle by confirming that states’ 
agencies are in fact  giving more account. This can help us to start answering our question 
affirmatively by saying yes, a high salience issue induces more account-giving.
7.2. Qualitative analyses
We demonstrated that the amount of information provided by  the DEA is clearly greater in the case 
of S/D agreement. We should therefore look in more detail at the kind of information provided to 
evaluate whether this can be considered as account-giving or not. To do so we will follow our 
timeframe. As every period has it own particular characteristics we think that the information 
should evolve accordingly. Thus, the account given will evolve relative to the context. 
The first period, which we named The Campaign, is characterised by  the authorities’ campaigning 
behaviour. The importance of the ratification and referendum campaign can be explained by  the will 
of the executive agency to support the project. This is illustrated by the multiple articles published 
in this period, demonstrating the utility of S/D for Switzerland. This reveals that  the executive 
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agency is responding to the salient concerns of the citizens. Indeed, if the citizens’ opinion was 
considered irrelevant, less resources would be spent on informing them.
A closer reading of the articles illustrates common characteristics during this period. We will first 
develop the elements regarding S/D and then ENV.
First, when the Bilateral Agreements are presented as a whole, the S/D agreement is usually put in 
evidence. For instance in the following passage: 
“(...) Switzerland effectively knew how to extensively impose its interests during the bilateral 
negotations: these were concluded together in all areas including the important Schengen/
Dublin topic”.18
The appearance of S/D in this context  clearly  indicates the importance of S/D inside the Bilateral 
Agreements II.
Second, this period is also characterised by an educative dimension. This takes the form of factual 
information concerning the consequences of the agreements for Switzerland. S/D is discussed to a 
larger extent in this case. This is clearly dedicated to informing the citizens about the implications 
of joining or rejecting S/D. For instance, in regards to the citizens’ concern about a loss of 
sovereignty, it is said that:
“(...) every new rule equivalent to a new treaty that Switzerland must approve according to its 
internal procedure, in case of major modifications, it is always the parliament and - if there is 
a referendum - the people who have the final word”.19
The agent is explaining to the principal that the agreement will not affect the power of the citizens. 
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18 “ (...) la Suisse a effectivement su largement imposer ses intérêts lors des négociations bilatérales: celles-ci ont été 
conclues ensemble dans tous le domaines y compris l’important dossier Schengen/Dublin.” Author’s note: All the 
citations of Suisseurope are translated by ourselves, we provide the original version in the footnote. 
Suisseurope, Ed. II, July 2004, pp. 1.
19 “(...) toute nouvelle règle équivaut à un nouveau traité que la Suisse doit approuver conformément à sa procédure 
interne, en cas de modification majeures c’est toujours le Parlement et - si référendum il y a - le peuple qui ont le 
dernier mot. “
Suisseurope, Ed. IV, April 2005, pp. 10-11.
Third, this period is also dedicated to the effect of implementation on different actors, in the case of 
acceptance after the referendum. It  refers to all actors concerned by the adoption of S/D. On one 
hand, the concerned actors claim that S/D will not provoke major problems within their tasks, while 
on the other hand, it will be for the benefit of Switzerland. 
For instance Christian Rey, president of Hotelleriesuisse20 states that: 
“We think that the «vis Schengen» will allow us to double the number of nights of the 
concerned countries (...) It is worth it!”.21
We can argue in this period that, even though implementation of the agreement has not yet  begun, 
the fact that the administration is still giving a large amount of information is a strong indication of 
the importance of citizens as a principal. Regarding the definition of Bovens, we see that the 
accountor informs the accountee to a large extent. The account-giving indicates a level of felt 
accountability of the DEA. There is no other apparent explanation for the difference in extent of 
information published.
Regarding the articles referring to ENV, they are all not dedicated specifically to this agreement. 
They are merely a general presentation of the 9 topics of the Bilateral Agreements II:
“Added to this is the reinforced cooperation in other political areas, such as internal security, 
asylum, environment and culture”.22
An in-depth comparison of the presentation of both agreements clearly  indicates a difference in 
account-giving. For instance, a detailed presentation of the EEA or European Environment 
Inforamtion and Observation Network (EIONET) could have been provided to clarify Switzerland’s 
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20 Umbrella organisation for the Swiss hostelry
21 “Nous pensons que le «vis Schengen» nous permettra de doubler le nombre de nuitées des pays concernés (...). Cela 
en vaut la peine!”
Ibid, pp. 12.
22 “A cela s’ajoute la coopération renforcée dans d’autres domaines politiques, comme la sécurité intérieure, l’asile, 
l’environnement et la culture”
Suisseurope, Ed. II, July 2004, pp. 2.
contribution to them. However, the administration did not provide this information. This illustrates 
the difference in account-giving in the two cases.
In the second period, which we entitled the Post-Campaign, the focus of the articles evolves. We 
see that the information is still provided to a significant extent. This can provide confirmation of the 
fact that, despite the completion of the referendum, the administration continues to show that they 
respond to citizens’ concerns. They must regularly keep the citizens informed regarding the steps of 
implementation.
Immediately  after the referendum there is no further need to convince nor inform the citizens about 
the implications of S/D. The approach is no longer focused on an explanation of what could happen 
in the future but more on what is happening at present. For instance the administration explains that 
Switzerland is waiting for the ratification process to be finalised on the EU side:
“It is first necessary to put into effect the bilateral agreements concluded to date. This 
particulary concerns the Schengen/Dublin agreements that have not yet been ratified by the 
EU”.23
By explaining the evolution of the process of ratification, the administration keeps the citizens 
informed. We can consider this as account-giving by the agent to the principal.
During this period the implementation itself had not yet begun thus the articles mainly  explain that 
Switzerland must  wait until the EU gives its final approval for the agreements’ application. The fact 
that the DEA is keeping the citizens informed about the different steps in this period provides a 
clear indicator of the felt accountability of the administration. Indeed, nothing major is occurring on 
the ground and there are no implications for the citizens. There is no field event to monitor, just an 
administrative process that takes some time to complete.
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23 “Il s’agit d’abord de mettre en vigueur tous les accords bilatéraux conclus à ce jour. Cela concerne en particulier les 
accords d’association à Schengen/Dublin qui n’ont pas encore été ratifiés par l’EU.”
Suisseurope, Ed. X, July 2007, pp. 1.
During this period only one article mentions ENV:
“April 1 has been marked by the entry into force of (..) new treaties: (...) Agreement on the 
environment that opens the way for improved coordination of environmental protection 
(...)”.24
It provided information about the agreement’s entry into force, however there is no great detail 
within the article. Also it was not dedicated specifically to the ENV topic but  instead listed a group 
of agreements entering into force at the same time. 
Thus in this period the information given about ENV is minimal and of limited informative value. 
For instance, while the S/D institutions, tools and future effects are explained in detail, the public 
merely know that ENV is entering into force. No article describes the EEA, how it works, how 
Switzerland will work and contribute to this organisation, etc. 
The third period, entitled Original Implementation, occurs directly  after the entry into force of the 
agreements. In this period, the flow in communication is at its lowest level. Our explanation for this 
is that the citizens were informed of the referendum’s effects during the campaign. Also during this 
period, the development of S/D did not play a central part in the administration’s agenda.
This period concerns the beginning of S/D implementation. During this phase, the communications 
monitor the S/D developments. The principal is informed about the evolution of S/D:
“The new Visa Code enters into force in the Schengen area. It integrates in a single text all 
the regulations of Schengen visas and makes them more clear and transparent.”.25
There is not much detail given; it consists of a brief reference to new elements in the 
implementation of the agreement. 
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24 “ Le 1er avril a ainsi été marqué par l’entrée en vigueur de (...) nouveaux traités: (...)l’Accord sur l’environnement 
qui ouvre la voie à une meilleure coordination en matière de protection de l’environnement”
Suisseurope, Ed. VI, April 2006, pp. 1.
25 “Le nouveau Code des visas entre en vigueur dans l’espace Schengen. Il intègre en un texte unique toutes les 
réglementations en matière de visas Schengen et les rend plus claires et transparentes.” Suisseurope, Ed. XIX, May 
2010, pp. 2.
In regard to ENV, there is absolutely no information given. For instance we could have expected 
that, as S/D has moved a bit away from its main focus, the DEA would have taken the initiative to 
present the way in which ENV is beginning its “active” life. However, nothing is said about the 
beginning of Swiss involvement in the EEA or any potential development of this agreement. This 
lack of information provides a clear indication of the link between account-giving and salience.
The fourth period, which we named Development in the Implementation, is a continuation of the 
third, and consists of a close monitoring of events taking place in the context of the agreement. The 
agent also presents the development of S/D. These articles have the same intention as the articles 
presenting S/D in the first period. Their purpose is to educate and explain the consequences of 
developments:
“The first round of negotiations for the participation of the Schengen States with the new IT 
Agency is situated in Brussels. The European Agency for the operational management of 
large-scale information systems (IT Agency) will have as its primary responsibility to ensure 
the operational management of SIS II, VIS and the Eurodac fingerprint database.”.26
During this period there is one mention of the ENV agreement. Again, this article is not dedicated 
specifically to this agreement but presents the relevant European agencies such as the EEA. The 
implications of ENV is not described in great detail.
In addition to this time-framed analysis, we made some further observations during our reading of 
Suisseurope that tend to confirm our hypothesis and which need to be highlighted here to complete 
the first step of our research. On a qualitative level it is interesting to underline the fact that when an 
article presents European policy or a Bilateral Agreement, S/D is usually put forward. For instance 
in the publication of September 2010 an article reports 50 years of existence of the Swiss mission in 
Bruxelles. A timeline of these 50 years is presented in which S/D is the only agreement that is 
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26 “La première ronde de négociation en vue de la participation des Etats associés à Schengen à la nouvelle Agence IT 
a lieu à Bruxelles. L’agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle 
(Agence IT) aura pour mission essentielle d’assurer la gestion opérationnelle du SISII, du VIS et de la base de données 
d’empreintes digitales Eurodac.” Suisseurope, Ed. XXXIV, November 2012.
clearly  mentioned. This observation itself is not enough to verify our hypothesis. However, 
regarding the previous qualitative and quantitative findings, it reinforces the importance of 
Schengen in the communications and information provided by the DEA. The use of S/D as an 
example of the relation between Switzerland and the EU is also repeated in other articles and 
sources. This demonstrates the importance and relevance of S/D within EU-related topics.
These results give a strong indication of the account-giving by the DEA. Thus, we can draw 
implications for the existing literature and confirm our hypothesis. 
8. Results’ Implications
Our results confirm the fact that the administration gives more account in cases of high salient 
topics. Nevertheless, our results can be further reinforced. Indeed the importance of communication 
at a qualitative or quantitate level seems sufficient. However, we can enhance our research by 
presenting alternative hypotheses. These will provide additional information to draw some 
conclusions for our hypothesis. This chapter must be mirrored with chapter 2, thus we will draw a 
similar structure. The first section will discuss our two sub-hypotheses. The second section is 
divided in two parts and will be dedicated to the implication of our results for the existing literature. 
The first part discusses the implication of our results on the link between foreign policy and the 
domestic sphere. The second part discusses the importance of our results for administrative studies.
 
8.1. Sub-hypotheses discussion
The first sub-hypothesis will examine whether more information is provided in the S/D case due to 
the felt accountability of the administration rather than the agreement’s effects on the legislative 
framework. In our discussion, we will rely mainly on the publication of Sandra Lavenex and 
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administrative sources. We shall follow her arguments and try  to find evidence of her opinion in the 
administrative sources at our disposal. 
Lavenex presents facts demonstrating that the Swiss legislative system is already largely in 
accordance with the EU system. She describes three ways in which the Swiss legislator has a de 
facto integration in the European legal system. The first is a multilateral approach. Switzerland is 
involved in intergovernmental cooperation from which the S/D agreements were drawn. The second 
is a bilateral approach. Switzerland signed agreements with neighbouring countries such as 
Germany and Austria, certain aspects of which exceed the S/D acquis. Finally, Switzerland has a 
unilateral approach based on a doctrine of autonomous follow-up. Nowadays before the adoption of 
a new law a Euro-compatible analysis is made. 
Considering these observations, Lavenex argues that S/D is not debated on because of its impact on 
the change of policy but rather its effects on central features of the Swiss political system, such as 
federalism and direct democracy. According to Lavenex, the pressure of bringing the Swiss system 
in line with the law does not lie at a policy level but instead at a deeper institutional level.
Our findings depart somewhat from Lavenex’s arguments. Indeed it  appears in the Message relatif à 
l’approbation des accords bilatéreaux entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne, y compris les actes 
législatifs relatifs à la transposition des accords (Message on the approval of bilateral agreements 
between Switzerland and the European Union, including legislative acts relating to the 
implementation of agreements) that 8 laws (LSEE, Lasi, CP, LRCF, Larm, LFMG, LHID, Lstup)27 
need to be modified to adopt S/D. On the other hand, ENV does not require any  modification to 
existing laws. This observation indicates that the difference in account-giving might be linked to the 
Lucien M. Engelberts                         41
27 LSEE: Federal Law of 26 March 1931 on the living and the establishment of foreigners, RS 1113.
Lasi: Federal Law of 26 June 1998 on asylum, RS 142.31.
CP: Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937, RS 311.0.
LRCF: Federal Law of March 1958 on the liability of the Confederation, members of its authorities and its officials, RS 
170.32.
Larm: Federal Law of 20 June 1997 on weapons, weapons’ accessories and ammunitions, RS 515.54.
LFMG: Federal Law of 13 December on war material, RS 514.51.
LHID: Federal Law of 14 December 1990 on the harmonisation of cantons and municipalities’ direct taxes, RS 642.14.
Lstup: Federal Law of 3 October 1951 on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, RS 812.121.
different levels of legislative modification required by the agreements. However if we look in more 
depth at the laws that need modification, we derive three observations. 
The first is that the concerned laws requiring modification never appear in the publications of the 
DEA, for instance a modification of the LStup is never mentioned. The only modification that 
seems to be monitored and presented in more detail is that concerning the LArm. For instance in the 
forum section of the 4th publication of Suisseurope a speech from the director of the shooting 
association is presented.28
The second observation is that these modifications are not at the “deep  institutional level” described 
by Lavenex. Direct democracy  and federalism are embodied by the Constitution and the S/D 
agreement does not modify  it. Nevertheless, a large number of Suisseurope articles mention the 
impact of S/D on these institutions. In the first  period it is explained for instance that any 
development of S/D will be the subject  of a referendum. Concerning the federalist institutions, a 
representative of the Cantons explains that S/D impacts are beneficial and should not be considered 
as a threat for Swiss federalism.
The third observation is that most of the articles do not explain the impact on the existing laws. 
They  are focused more on the added value of being a member of S/D. For instance Schengen 
Information System (SIS) or FRONTEX “tools” are described in great detail to the public but not as 
much is said about the change in the LHID.
We disagree with Lavenex when she says that there is not much change induced by the adoption of 
S/D at the legislative level. A comparison between the two agreements clearly demonstrates that 
there is in fact a difference in the level of change affected, as discussed above. However, this 
difference is not the source of more account-giving as there is no link between the information 
given and the legislative impact. These three observations demonstrate that the level of change in 
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28 Suisseurope, Ed. IV, April 2005, pp. 14.
policy does not seem to affect the account-giving. This reinforces the finding of the main hypothesis 
by providing information that account-giving in S/D is due to felt accountability.
The conclusions of Lavenex are nevertheless relevant for our research. By explaining that the 
debates surrounding S/D are based on its impact on direct democracy and federalism she provides a 
source of salience. Direct democracy and federalism are sensitive topics for the Swiss public, so if 
S/D is perceived as a risk for these institutions it will increase the salience of the topic. Our paper 
does not try to explain the sources of salience but it is nonetheless interesting to develop this 
observation. Indeed salience does not emerge out of the blue; it is based on a number of elements. 
Thus if these elements are impacted it is likely  that the issue will be salient and this will be 
indicated by the presence of a referendum.
We will now discuss our second sub-hypothesis before discussing the implications of our results. 
Our results demonstrate that the DEA is giving more account, however we should also confirm that 
this account is directed primarily at the public to verify  the principal-agent link. The main indicator 
we can point to is that one of the aims of the DEA is to inform. According to its information 
booklet: 
“The DEA informs the media and the general public about Swiss EU policy and about the 
European integration process in general”.29 
This is a strong indication that the publication Suisseurope is targeted at the principal and reinforces 
our main hypothesis.
However, it can be argued that the DEA gives more account to other actors such as the parliament. 
Parliamentarians act as the representatives of the citizens and are considered as an intermediate 
actor between the principal and agent. Thus giving account to the parliament is, in a sense, giving 
account to the principal. It would require more resources and time to assess the actors to which the 
DEA is giving more account and analyse the communications between the administration and 
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29 At the heart of Swiss European Policy, January 2013, pp. 2. http://www.europa.admin.ch/org/00447/index.html?
lang=en Consulted on the 10.05.2013.
parliament. Nevertheless, regarding the analysed information, we can confirm rather strongly  that 
the account-giving is aimed at the citizens. Account-giving links foreign ministry agencies as agent 
to the citizens as principal.
We will now present the contribution of our results and their implication for the existing literature. 
This will give us a basis on which to introduce how our findings can be generalised and completed 
by other research. It will also be a ground on which to base a more normative discussion.
8.2. Implication for Foreign policy literature
Putnam successfully theorises the link between the domestic and international factors that 
contribute to foreign policy (Putnam, 1988). We stated that the “freedom” of a government could be 
affected by the size of the domestic win set. Our results demonstrate that the Swiss government is in 
fact giving more account in the case of the S/D agreement. Moreover this account-giving is not due 
to any apparent factors other than that of salience, as indicated by a referendum. Also accountability 
seems directed toward the citizens, our principal. These findings reinforce the importance of the 
domestic win set over the international one. Thus if a scholar intends to understand the relation 
between the domestic and international spheres he must  take public opinion into account. Our 
results demonstrate that the link between these two dimensions cannot be ignored. For instance a 
study of intergovernmental negotiations should address the public opinion in its method. Our 
research did not address the contents of foreign policy but rather on the process of policy 
implementation and how domestic public opinion impacts on this to a certain extent. Our results 
show that  in the process of implementation the agent gives account in correlation to the salience of 
public opinion. Thus we demonstrated that there is a link between implementation and public 
opinion and therefore future study on foreign policy implementation must take these factors into 
account.
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In addition, our findings are an important contribution for those who attempt to understand and 
study the importance to be given to domestic factors. With regard to its particularism, the Swiss 
case, with the strong involvement of citizens in the process of ratification, is a perfect case study for 
this question. Our results demonstrate that the citizens’ opinion is an important factor in examining 
the process of account-giving in relation to foreign policy. Thus understanding the role played by 
public opinion is important for scholars interested in the process of ratification. Furthermore, our 
findings confirm the importance of pubic opinion salience. They also confirm that it is the most 
important domestic factor. Indeed, as the context and all other factors were the same in the 
implementation of the two agreements, the only valid explanation for a difference in the account-
giving is salience. Kaarbo’s argument that the process of ratification is a factor which may influence 
policy outcomes is insufficient; it is not enough to state that domestic factors must be analysed. Our 
findings support the fact that more attention should be given to the public opinion in an analysis as 
it is the most important factor.
Our findings support the position of O’Connor and Vucetic and confirm the fact that any analysis of 
the process of foreign policy  implementation cannot ignore the importance of domestic public 
opinion saliency. This confirms our assumption that denying the importance of public opinion 
would make our question irrelevant. The result of the study brings into question any attempt to 
understand foreign policy without taking the public opinion saliency into account.
Finally our results also confirm that, while looking at the substance of foreign policy is one aspect, 
by focusing on the process of policy implementation we add a new and valuable perspective to 
foreign policy research. These findings can be very useful for scholars who intend to understand the 
relation of control between citizens and their representatives. It is not only  important to focus on the 
design of the institutions themselves but an assessment of information-giving is just as important in 
order to guarantee a level of control over representatives. Our results indicate that  the agent is 
providing more information in relation to high salience issues thereby exposing itself to increased 
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control. This is an alternative answer to the question of control rather than simply saying that 
citizens directly control the substance of policies by choosing another delegate based on a political 
program.
8.3. Implication for Administrative studies
Our research and results also contribute to a better understanding of the factors linking public 
opinion and the administrative body. The assumed independence of the public administration is 
limited by public opinion salience.
Nincic states that we must look closely at  the role of the administration in foreign policy making. 
Our research supports this approach and gives further information on how foreign policy is 
implemented. We demonstrate that foreign policy cannot be fully  explained if domestic public 
opinion is ignored. Our results show that the DEA modifies the level of account given in correlation 
with and proportionate to public opinion salience. This illustrates the importance of the principal in 
the process of implementation. This further demonstrates the felt accountability  as the DEA is 
communicating more about the process of implementation. In other words, there is felt 
accountability to uphold the mandate given by the principal.
Allison describes how the administration chooses a certain output depending on the various inputs 
involved. Our findings build on this approach. Indeed, some inputs are more important than others 
in the explanation of this relation. Front line workers are subject to a number of different pressures. 
The fact that they give more account  in the case of S/D seemingly reveals a certain level of 
significance attached to the citizens as principal. There is no other explanation to the difference in 
account-giving between S/D and ENV. 
The asymmetry of information is a fact. It would be illusory to pretend that the public is as well 
informed as a department completely dedicated to the implementation of European policy. 
However, this observation does not always mean that the administration will use this advantage to 
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favour its own agenda. Scholars discuss the importance of the administrative body in the 
implementation process and how its independence can allow it to follow their own agenda 
regardless of the principal’s mandate. Without denying the importance of the front line workers in 
the assessment during the implementation phase, our results clearly  show that the administrative 
body keeps the principal informed of the progress of implementation when faced with a salient 
topic. 
Moreover, Pollack argues that  the independence of the agent is a source of conflict between the 
principal and the agent (Pollack, 2003: 108). Due to this, a certain level of administrative control 
must be enforced in order to ensure that the agent follows its mandate. Our results dispute this 
argument; a strong democratic felt accountability in the case of salient issues appears to be enough 
for the agent to follow its mandate. There is no special commission which monitors the work of the 
foreign ministry. The administration accomplishes its daily  task in line with its mandate and 
therefore communicates about its actions to prove it is doing so. The law of transparency forces the 
Chancellery to communicate but the extent of communication by the DEA cannot be explained by 
this factor alone, especially  considering the different level in salience between the different 
agreements (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006: 57-61). Hence our research demonstrates that  democratic 
accountability appears to be a relatively costless way of keeping front line workers in check.
There are administrative laws in place which govern required levels of communication, for instance 
the Federal Chancellery has to publish and inform about the corpus juris and its development. Part 
of the DEA’s mandate is also to communicate about European related policy. However, this does not 
account for the greater level of information given in the case of S/D than ENV. The only valid 
argument to explain this variation is the difference in salience. Indeed one could argue that  being a 
member of S/D is a greater deal than being a member of EEA and this is exactly why the 
administration communicates more. 
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We are not denying the fact that front line workers benefit from a certain degree of autonomy and 
that there is an asymmetry in the information. However, we disagree with the proposed effect of 
these elements. Indeed when facing a high salient issue it appears that front line workers 
acknowledge their mandate, and communicate about their tasks to demonstrate that they are 
following it.
Our findings clearly  contradict Drezner’s argument; the public opinion influence can force the 
administration to modify the process of implementation. The agencies can still do what they  want 
but they  must explain what they do. They must be more transparent in cases of high salient topics. 
The autonomy and asymmetry of information in cases of salient issues could still explain a 
difference between the mandate given and the implementation of policy. However, our results show 
that the implementation and thus any deviation from a mandate given must be justified. Some 
scholars have already linked the importance of public debate with implementation (Brighi & Hill, 
2008) and our findings confirm that this link should not be underestimated.
Finally our results are clearly in conflict with neo-realists’ assumption. Neo-realists deny the need 
to take into account domestic factors in the explanation of foreign policy. This theoretical 
assumption seems to be clearly contradicted by our results. Indeed if the foreign ministry agencies 
spend resources to inform the public to such an extent it  means that public opinion does in fact 
matter. We do not see any other explanation for this behaviour. Any electoral pressure is irrelevant 
as front line workers are not elected by the citizens. Moreover, the Swiss electoral system requires 
that the government is elected by  the parliament and not by the citizens. Thus the electoral pressure 
of the citizens on the government is not as important as compared to other countries where the 
executive is directly elected. By demonstrating that agencies give more account when faced with a 
salient public opinion, we demonstrate that domestic factors, and more specifically public opinion, 
matter.
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In conclusion, our results contribute to the existing literature which discusses the link between 
domestic factors and foreign policy  and administration studies. Nevertheless, further research and 
developments can be made with our results and this is discussed in the following chapter.
9. Further Research, Developments and Normative Discussion
In this chapter we will present how we can generalise our research and how it can be addressed in 
further studies and developments. A normative discussion will introduce our research in a broader 
philosophical environment. The first section will be a generalisation which will demonstrate the 
utility  of our research and findings. The second section will propose ideas for further research that 
could be conducted to supplement our results. The third section will be a normative discussion of 
our thesis which will give a wider dimension to our research.
9.1. Generalisation
The debate surrounding what it is that influences foreign policy is one of the most central debates 
for international relations students. The complexity of this particular form of policy, which is at  the 
nexus between domestic and international influences, makes this task particularly difficult. Our 
thesis tries to bring a new perspective to this issue. We do not deny  that many factors must be taken 
into account in understanding why a state enacts a particular foreign policy. However, it  appears 
that the influence of public opinion is, in most cases, underestimated. When it is addressed in the 
existing literature, scholars mostly  limit the analysis to the electoral behaviour of the citizens and 
how they could potentially sanction the government. We consider our approach much more 
inclusive. We do not limit the citizens’ expression of preference to a choice between persons who 
will represent them but we also think that public opinion on issues, rather than simply on 
representatives, must be taken into account. Our cases, with a referendum as the indicator, facilitate 
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this approach. The two cases we focused on illustrated how the intensity of account-giving varies 
according to the level of public opinion salience.
Switzerland is a laboratory in which referendums and direct democracy render the link between the 
citizens and executive agencies stronger. However, our results can be extended to other cases and 
contexts as direct democracy  and democracies are based on similar values. In every  democracy the 
executive is held accountable to a certain extent by  the citizens thus the government has a certain 
duty to communicate about its actions when faced with salient issues. We support the fact  that 
similar results can be found in every  democratic country. Public opinion saliency  does in fact induce 
the executive agencies to give more account when implementing foreign policy. This argument is 
important for scholars who want to address the relation between domestic and foreign policy. By 
integrating the level of account-giving regarding policy implementation as related to the salience of 
a topic, scholars can complete their understanding of the relation between citizens and their 
executive. It might be the case that the communication of information in general is at a low level 
but the difference in the intensity  of communication between various topics will still be present. 
Every  democratically elected government will provide more information on a controversial 
international treaty than a highly technical bilateral trade agreement. 
We also think that  these features can be identified in non-democratic countries. Even if a 
dictatorship  is less concerned by public opinion they still require a certain level of support  and thus 
might be more willing to provide information, true or false, to the population on a salient topic. This 
point demonstrates that public opinion has a certain impact on the implementation of foreign policy 
as information must be provided to a mobilised public opinion.
One of the main elements of administrative studies is the asymmetry of information, which gives 
more power to the agent as they can do what they want. In the case of foreign policy, this element 
was not sufficiently  addressed. Our case presents a situation in which information is given in more 
depth. Thus by giving account, the agent is diminishing the impact of the asymmetry  of 
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information. Any research which examines foreign policy  implementation must take this element 
into account. A government facing a salient issue will need to be more careful when implementing 
policies as it is expected to communicate more about it. 
9.2. Further Research
Based on the generalisation of our results, we will introduce avenues for further research that could 
be explored to affirm and reinforce our findings by extending them to other cases. 
Most of the elements we presented refer to the first expression of account-giving as defined by 
Bovens (accountor informs the accountee). The two other ways in which to express accountability 
(accountee must be able to question the accountor, accountee can evaluate the behaviour of the 
accountor) could not be addressed in great depth in our research due to time and space limitations. 
However, in our data analyses we came across information relating to these two dimensions. We 
cannot draw strong conclusions on this at present but it  certainly  indicates the existence of the two 
other possible expressions of accountability. This should be addressed in further research. For 
instance, in line with the second expression of accountability, it is possible to contact the DEA 
through its webpage.30  Additional research could for instance evaluate the level of the 
administration’s responsiveness when questioned by the citizens. Regarding the third dimension of 
accountability, it is also possible to evaluate the quality  of the publications online.31  Both of the 
aforementioned elements should be addressed in further research to verify  their value as an 
indicator of account-giving.
Regarding our quantitative research we attempted to use more developed statistical analytical tools 
to reinforce and complete our findings. However, this approach was unsuccessful due to the limited 
amount of variables and cases. Furthermore, due to limited time and resources it was not possible to 
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30 http://www.europa.admin.ch/kontakt/index.html?lang=en Consulted on the 07.06.2013
31 http://www.europa.admin.ch/dienstleistungen/00553/01726/index.html?lang=fr Consulted on the 07.06.2013
introduce other cases, for instance other agreements, and to control them with control variables. 
Some variables could have been added for example by searching for the exchange of information 
between the executive agencies and the parliament. We considered a number of other ways in which 
to improve our quantitative analysis however we were unable to pursue them.
Regarding our findings, it would be interesting to propose other studies in other contexts, countries, 
etc., to confirm whether the difference in degree of account-giving between salient issues is the 
same or not. If, as our findings supposed, a democratic state is giving more account when faced 
with a high salience issue a difference between topics should be observed in any case. The level of 
information given might be lower or higher but a difference in flow is to be expected nevertheless. 
This would reinforce our findings by proving that the accountability is proportionate to the salience.
On the other hand we are also more inclusive while looking at the front line workers. Limiting the 
analysis of foreign policy to the governmental program is much too restrictive. We think that 
international relations students should be more aware of the importance of the administration. 
Account-giving is an important element that should be considered in detail in this context. Indeed 
the focus here should be on the role of accountability  as an indicator of concern among the front 
line workers. 
Additionally, we did not find any information concerning the reality of accountability. We think that 
the theory surrounding this concept needs to be further developed. Indeed the relation between the 
states as agent and citizens as principal is quite complex and deserves more attention. Some 
reflections are made about the electoral control or different ways in which to conceive the 
institutions to guarantee transparency and monitoring. This management approach is probably 
sufficient for a “micro” approach of a particular office about a particular policy, for instance how 
the healthcare office responds to changes in policies. However, a “macro” approach which views 
states in a much wider sense is missing. Our case demonstrates that electoral control is not only the 
way in which citizens can control their government but how they can also directly  influence the 
Lucien M. Engelberts                         52
front line workers. Our focus was on foreign policy as it is apparently backed by administrations 
which are more reluctant to follow domestic opinion (Kissinger, 1969: 263). Even in this case we 
demonstrate that this assumption is mistaken and that foreign policy  front line workers do in fact 
acknowledge the public opinion. This conclusion could be extended on a broader level to street 
level bureaucracy. This is defined by Lipsky as being composed of public service workers who 
interact directly with citizens. In this case, the relation of principal-agent should be stronger 
(Lipsky, 1980: 3).
The principal-agent relation between the citizens and the state is more complex than the electoral 
process. Accountability  is also more complex a concept than the mere giving of regular information. 
However, this fact seems to be ignored, or at least not addressed in enough depth, by scholars who 
instead focus on a more “micro” approach. This narrow focus fails to adequately  address the 
broader impact of accountability on the democratic process as a whole and the fundamental 
dimension of the relation of power within a democracy. 
The purpose of our research is to demonstrate that democratic states are responsive to domestic 
salience in the implementation of policy. The question of whether it  is a desirable effect or not is 
another issue, which is outside the scope of our research. We propose that scholars engaging in 
further research have a closer look at the causes and characteristics of salience. The referendum is a 
simple indicator but it  can cover a number of different causes. For instance in our case, Swiss 
citizens are usually concerned about direct-democracy related issues. It would increase the validity 
of our findings to link the causes of salience to the related topics in the giving of account. Thus 
further research will reinforce our conclusions as a more precise indicator of salience would be 
established by linking it with a particularly salient topic. A referendum fails to look at the precise 
reasons for which a topic becomes salient. It acts as a kind of umbrella institution that can cover a 
number of various movements and concerns, one of which may be the real reason for account-
giving.
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Other methodological limits we think are important to raise for further research is related to the role 
played by the principal. Our paper focuses on the agent and the steps it takes in giving account. We 
have no indication that this account-giving meets the requirement mandated by  the principal. 
Further research should also address the evaluation of the principal based on their views of the 
information given by the agent.
Another element that should be further explored is the link between accountability and the ideal 
concept of democracy, in which the representative is supposed to give account to the citizens to 
ensure that he is doing what he was mandated to do. It might be the case that account-giving is not 
due to a democratic accountability responding to democratic values but is based on other factors 
instead. For instance in reference to observations made by  Vahl and Grolimund, we think that it 
would be interesting to examine the account-giving of a political organisation and the reasons for 
which it gives account (Vahl & Grolimund, 2006: 58). An international organisation is not linked to 
citizens by a democratic process. Thus a study comparing accountability  between a state and an 
international organisation could be a way of clarifying on which basis account is given, notably the 
importance of a democratic relation.
9.3. Normative Discussion
Our results demonstrate that executive agencies will inform the citizens about foreign policy 
implementation when faced with a salient topic. Nevertheless, this does not mean that non-salient 
topics do not have wider implications for the wellbeing of the citizens of a country. If agencies only 
communicate when a topic is salient this means that the citizens must raise awareness of their 
concerns. Executive agencies are less likely to give information if there is no incentive given by the 
citizens. Such a lack of mobilisation could result in an absence in account-giving and finally of 
control by the citizens of the States’ actions. Hence our results seem to indicate that account-giving 
requires a certain level of mobilisation among the citizens for it  to occur. Without this mobilisation, 
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a government could virtually  be free to act as it wishes and provide little to no information about its 
actions.
Our thesis confirms a normative assumption that a democratic state is supposed to “serve” its 
citizens. We can discuss this assumption in more detail and show that it is more complex in reality. 
In a wider sense, a state is not an isolated island; it has contact and relations with its neighbours and 
the rest of the world and these elements are also a source of moral and legal obligations. Indeed in 
this situation democratic states play  the role of “inbetweeners”. On one side the citizens are 
considered as the sovereign and theoretically  should be able to impose their view. On the other 
hand, the international community provides a major source of obligations or normative rules that 
are difficult to deviate from. In this way, we could also consider the international sphere as a form 
of principal. This assumption leads us to question which principal holds the greatest influential 
power in the making of foreign policy. To give a concrete illustration of this dilemma we can for 
instance point to a scenario in which the population of a democratic state elects a party to power 
which has as its objective the segregation of a minority. This would violate international rules. In 
this case is it actually better for the government to have a felt  accountability in regard to its citizens 
or the international jus cogens? In general, democracy is considered as a good political system but it 
can create negative outcomes. In such a case, states’ institutions should be a safeguard.
Our thesis demonstrates that a salience in public opinion has a direct influence on states’ 
institutions. Our cases raised a problem which is not in violation of international norms. In case of a 
refusal by the Swiss citizens to become a member of S/D, the result would not have violated any 
rules of jus cogens. However, we can imagine a scenario in which salience in the opinion opposes 
the jus cogens. In such a case it would probably  be, from a normative point of view, wrong to see 
the front line workers blindly following the will of the citizens.
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This chapter demonstrates a generalisation of our thesis. However further research should be 
conducted to complete our understanding of the relation between domestic public opinion and 
foreign policy. This is even more important considering the fact that this issue is highly normative.
10. Conclusion
At the beginning of our research, we presupposed that public opinion matters in democracies; we 
did not expect  to see any difference in our findings. We do not deny  that there are probably  some 
other influential factors which lead to a variation in account-giving. However, a quick look at our 
quantitative results show such a strong difference in account-giving between our two cases that it 
could not be ignored and the explanation for this difference required further examination. The DEA 
as an agent is clearly  giving account to the principal. This conclusion should encourage researchers 
to continue to analyse foreign policy under new lenses and bring back the focus to internal factors.
Our thesis demonstrates that there are clear differences in the account-giving between different 
topics. At this point, with limited time and resources, it is difficult to conclude more than to say that 
S/D and ENV are treated differently by the DEA and this is correlated to the salience of the public 
opinion. Thus our conclusion should be considered as a first step  towards further research which 
must address the causality between account-giving and salience in more depth. As we said, there are 
still a number of elements that should be further explored to complete our understanding of this 
relation. Our findings also raised a number of questions on the importance of account-giving in 
democratic countries and to what extent it  is good or bad to have a selection of topics depending on 
their salience. 
We can say without doubt that  high salience has an influence on the extent of account given by the 
government to the citizens. However this affirmation should be considered more as a first  step to 
further explore the link between public opinion and the implementation of foreign policy. For 
instance further research could address how we can measure the influence of public opinion more 
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accurately or how its influence varies depending on the context. These questions should be 
addressed by scholars to complete the understanding of the relation between domestic factors and 
foreign policy.
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